In this Appendix there are four sub-sections supporting claims we make in the paper about the robustness of our results. In Appendix A we show that the optimal mechanism we derived is also optimal under Bayesian implementation. In Appendix B we derive the optimal mechanism when transfers can depend on the outcome of the project. In Appendix C we consider agents whose interests are partially aligned with those of the agency, so that they might prefer another high quality project to be selected. In Appendix D we allow for the possibility that an agent's bene…t function b i (q i ) takes negative values for low qualities. To keep notation shorter we assume throughout this Appendix that the outside option is q = 0:
(1) subject to feasibility : n X i=1 p i (q) m and 0 p j (q) 1 for all q and j;
(2) limited liability (LL i ) : t i (q) 0 for all i and for all q;
(3) and the following interim incentive compatibility constraints for all i; and for all q i and q 0 i ,
Recall that we de…ned for any quality of project i; q i ,
to be the virtual return that is obtained from selecting project i and assumed that this function is strictly increasing.
Clearly, the derivations of the one project case remain unchanged. Recall from that section that we de…ned a i (q ) = 8 > > > < > > > :
and showed that there exists a quality g i 2 [E [q i ] ; G i (q i )] ; unique in R; such that V (g i ) g i = 0:
Also recall that for any (n-dimensional) vector of project qualities q we de…ne an (n + m)-dimensional vector of virtual project qualities
x(q) = 0 @ min fG 1 (q 1 ) ; g 1 g ; :::; min fG n (q n ) ; g n g ; 0; :::; 0 | {z } m times 1 A :
and the sum of its m largest components is S m (x(q)) :
We show that at any feasible mechanism in the Bayesian problem the …rm pro…t is bounded by E q [S m (x(q))] which is the optimal pro…t in the optimal dominant strategy mechanism. Since the optimal mechanism is feasible in the Bayesian problem, it is also optimal for the Bayesian problem. To proof this we follow the same steps as in the proof of theorem 1.
Lemma A1
Let the expected payo¤ of manager i in the optimal mechanism be M i (
The target function in (1) can be written as
Proof of Lemma A1. We apply the "Mirlees trick" (see Mirlees, 1974 and Fudenberg and Tirole, 1992) to prove this lemma. The series of transformations in this proof are familiar for this type of models, but we include them here for completeness.
Proof of Lemma A2. Let q be a vector of qualities. First, by IIC i we have
otherwise agent i's type q i would have an incentive to misreport as q i : By LL i ; we have t i (q) 0; thus for all q;
For all q i > a i (g i ) we have G i (q i ) > g i ; where a i ( ) is de…ned in (6). Therefore,
The inequality between the second and third lines is an implication of the constraint (13): The last equality holds by de…nition of the cap g i (in (7)). Therefore,
where the last equality holds because, for all q i < a i (g i ) ; we have G i (q i ) < g i ; and
for all q i > a i (g i ) ; we have g i > G i (q i ) :
Proof of Theorem 1 in Bayesian version. The pro…t of the …rm at some arbitrary mechanism satisfying (2)-(4) equals
@ min fG 1 (q 1 ) ; g 1 g ; :::; min fG n (q n ) ; g n g ; 0; ::
where the …rst expression for the pro…t was derived in Lemma A1, the …rst inequality holds by Lemma A2, and the second holds because of the feasibility constraints (2).
Under the proposed mechanism, all the weak inequalities above hold as equalities everywhere, thus the mechanism achieves the optimal pro…t. The mechanism also satis…es the constraints (2)-(4), therefore it is optimal.
Appendix B -State Contingent Transfers
In this online appendix consider mechanisms with state contingent transfers. To do this we need to introduce a state space describing possible realized returns of the …nanced projects. Let the return of each project i be a nonnegative random variable R i : We assume that, conditional on q i ; all R i are independent and have the same support R [0; +1). Each project i requires an initial investment I i that does not depend on q i : We assume that the quality q i of project i is its expected net return conditional on q i ,
That is, the project quality which is known to the managers is the expected return of the project. Under these assumptions, we provide an upper bound on the value that the …rm can obtain when the …rm can pay transfers contingent on the realization of both the project stochastic allocation, and the selected projects'outcomes. A state s = (M; R) indicates the set of projects (if any) that were selected M N and the realization of the return of the projects which were selected R 2 R jMj :
A mechanism is a function (b q; s) 7 ! (p (b q) ; t (b q; s)) : To shorten notation let us denote the expected transfer conditional on true qualities by
Incentive constraints are given by
Limited liability constrains need to hold state-by-state, i.e.
We can rewrite the optimization problem as follows.
s:t: : feasibility (2), state-by-state limited liability (15) and IC (14) The solution method for this problem follows similar steps as in sections III and IV in the paper. We derive an upper bound for the optimal value, and then propose a mechanism that satis…es the constraints and (here only approximately) achieves the upper bound.
Let V be the value of the target function at some arbitrary mechanism that satis…es all the constraints. Let g i be this level of the outside option, which solves
For each project i; let the virtual quality of project i be rede…ned in the current context as e
where g i is de…ned by (17). Let e x(q) = 0 @ min fq 1 + b 1 (q 1 ) ; g 1 g ; :::; min fq n + b n (q n ) ; g n g ; 0; :::; 0 | {z } m times 1 A be the vector of virtual qualities, and S m (e x(q)) the sum of the m largest virtual qualities.
Lemma 1 proves a preliminary result used in lemma 2 which derives the upper bound for the value.
Lemma B1
At any mechanism that satis…es the constraints (2), limited liability (15) and (14) of the state dependent problem, the following holds, for each agent i 2 N .
Proof of lemma B1. Let a i be the unique quality threshold that maximizes the left-hand side in the equation (17). The …rst-order condition yields a i +b i (a i ) = g i ; so that, for all q i < a i ; we have q i +b (q i ) < g i ; and for all q i > a i ; we have q i +b (q i ) > g i :
Rearranging (17), we obtain
We …rst show the following inequality:
Where p i (q) = sup q i fp i (q)g : The inequality between the second and third lines follows from p i (q) p i (q) and from (18) which implies that (q i + b (q i )) g i 0 in the integrated range, and from the constraints p i (q) b (q i ) U i (q). The last equality holds by (19) . Therefore,
which further implies
where the inequality holds by (20) and the last equality holds by (18).
We now turn to the upper bound on the value of the problem.
Lemma B2
For any mechanism with state-dependent transfers that satis-…es feasibility (2), limited-liability (15) and incentive constraints (14), the value is bounded as follows.
The value of this target function at any mechanism that satis…es the constraints, V; will satisfy the following
where the …rst inequality holds by Lemma 1, and the second holds because of the feasibility constraints (2).
The lemma implies that the …rm's pro…t is bounded above by V sup . Under certain conditions which we soon list, V sup is the supremum of the …rm's pro…t for all mechanisms that satisfy the constraints (2), (15) and (14). It may not be achieved, but we can construct a mechanism that yields a pro…t that is "-close to the bound V sup in Lemma 2.
We assume from now that the bene…t functions b i (:) are convex in the expected net return q i and less than unit elastic with respect to the expected gross return
for all q i . In particular this includes the case where the private bene…t function is
We now propose a mechanism that gives the …rm a pro…t close to the upper bound. 1 Consider the following allocation rule
According to this allocation rule, a project that has a virtual quality lower than the m-th highest virtual quality is not selected. A project that has a virtual quality higher than the m-th highest virtual quality is selected for sure, and the rest of the 1 To come up with this proposed mechanism we …rst solved the simpler problem in which transfers can depend on the true quality of all projects, not just the selected ones. The derivation of this mechanism follows similar steps to our previous analysis and we thus omit it.
projects are chosen at random from the set of projects that have exactly the m-th highest virtual quality.
The approximation allocates projects according to p with probability 1 "; for a given " > 0 and selects projects at random (with equal probabilities) with probability ": The resulting allocation rule is
Transfers are adjusted in order to satisfy the constraints. Let X be the event where project i is not selected, which occurs with probability 1 p " i (b q). Consider the following transfers to manager i in any state in s 2 X , and in any state
Note that these transfers are well-de…ned only when p " i (b q) > 0 for all b q > 0; which is the reason why we need " > 0 and why the supremum V sup cannot be achieved, but only approximated. The expected transfer to manager i; conditional on the vector q is
We show next that this mechanism satis…es all the constraints and delivers a value that is "-close to the upper bound. Denote the payo¤ of project manager i when reported qualities are (b q i ; b q i ) and his true quality is q i by U i (b q i ; b q i ; q i ). We now verify that incentive compatibility holds. Indeed, we have
The …rst term of this sum is always nonnegative. Indeed,
Thus, for all true quality q i and vector of reported qualities b q;
This ensures that the proposed mechanism is incentive-compatible. Because b i (q i )
the limited liability constraint is also satis…ed. Moreover, evaluating the target function at the mechanism indexed by " yields
where V max is the upper bound in Lemma 2. Since E (q i ) V max ; this value is lower than but approximates V max ; in the limit where " goes to 0:
Theorem B
The project selection mechanism given by the allocation rule (24) and the transfers (25)-(26) is almost optimal for the problem stated in (16).
Proof of Theorem B. Consider the allocation rule p de…ned in (23) and the expected transfers conditional on q; t given by
Under the mechanism de…ned by p and t ; all the weak inequalities in Lemma 2 hold as equalities. Thus, p and t yield the upper bound V sup from Lemma 2. One can easily verify that the mechanism de…ned by p " and t " satisfy the constraints (2), (15) and (14). Next, the allocation rule p " and the expected transfers t " are convex combinations of the allocation rule p and expected transfers t and the allocation rule and expected transfers of the random selection mechanism.
The allocation rule p and transfers t yield V sup , whereas the random allocation mechanism yields the value 1
This value is lower than V sup ; but its limit is V sup as " goes to 0:
Appendix C -Partially aligned interests
In this appendix, we analyze the situation where managers have interests that are at least partially aligned with those of the …rm in the sense that each manager i enjoys some private bene…t, not only when his own project is selected, in which case he receives the bene…t b i (q i ) ; but also when another manager's project is selected.
In such a situation, it is natural to assume that the bene…t manager i receives is an increasing function d ij (q j ) of the quality q j of the selected project j; which could in principle also depend on the label of the selected project j: To …x ideas, consider the case of n agents and one project (m = 1). For all i; manager i's utility for all q is
so that we get the following incentive compatibility constraints: for all q; for all i;
and for all q 0 i ,
In the extreme case where manager i's bene…t functions b i ( ) and d ij ( ) are the same function, increasing in quality, the agent prefers the highest quality project to be selected, regardless of whether it is his own project. In such a case, the interests of the agents and the …nancing agency are perfectly aligned. A mechanism that chooses the highest reported quality project and never o¤ers transfers would be optimal. However, when at least for some qualities q i , an agent enjoys his own project being …nanced more than someone else's project with the same quality, an adverse selection problem remains. To simplify the analysis, we will focus on the case where if the optimal mechanism selects manager i, then this manager would rather be selected than let another agent be selected. This condition requires that b i (q i ) > d ij (q j ) whenever i 0 s virtual quality is at least as high as j 0 s: The condition can hold true when the bene…t from a manager's own project from being selected is higher than the bene…t of another being selected when their quality di¤erence is not too high. 2 Our results in this section parallel the results we obtained for the main model.
Lemma C1
Let the payo¤ of manager i in the optimal mechanism be
The target function can be written as
This generalizes the function G i (q i ) from the main model. We assume from now on that H i (q i ) is an increasing function.
Proof of Lemma C1. We can show that
exactly like in the proof of Lemma A1 (main text) substituting this into (27) and rearranging yields the following expression.
Fix q i : Using integration by parts in the same way as in the proof of Lemma A1 in the main text, we can show that
Taking the expectation over q i and adding up over i yields
At any mechanism that satis…es the constraints, the following holds, for each agent i 2 N .
Proof of Lemma C2. Let i be an agent and let q be a vector of qualities. By
otherwise agent i with quality q i would have an incentive to misrepresent his quality by reporting q i : By LL i ; we know :that t i (q i ; q i ) 0; and by feasibility, we know
Next, noting that H i , and h i play exactly the same role as G i and g i ; the rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma A2 in the main text. It is therefore omitted.
Theorem C The expected pro…t of the …rm at the optimal mechanism equals E q h max i [min fH i (q i ) ; h i g ; 0]
i :
The mechanism that selects the project i with the highest virtual quality rede…ned as min fH i (q i ) ; h i g ;
randomizes with equal probabilities between projects that achieve the maximum and compensate the managers according to the transfers
is optimal.
The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 1 in the main text, and is therefore omitted. 3 We would now like to compare the optimal pro…t achieved by the …rm in this problem (partial interest alignment) to the pro…t that the …rm achieves in the case without interest alignment, i.e. the case where d ij (q i ) = 0 for all i and j, which is the one studied in the main model. The comparison is immediate from the expected pro…t expressions. Because for all i and all q i ; we have
where the equality is from the de…nition of h i : Then, by de…nition of g i ; we obtain that g i < h i : This implies that the problem with partial alignment has a higher virtual quality for each agent and at each reported quality than the problem with no alignment:
min fG i (q i ) ; g i g < min fH i (q i ) ; h i g :
This lead to the following expected pro…t comparison.
Corollary C: The …rm's expected pro…t is higher under partial alignment than under nonalignment.
One can easily see that the allocation of the optimal mechanism in the absence of partial alignment is implementable under partial alignment using transfers (29).
These transfers are smaller than the ones that are used in the absence of alignment:
the di¤erence between the transfers under alignment and under nonalignment is for all i and all q;
and the resulting expected pro…t is therefore higher in the alignment case. This observation immediately shows that the optimal pro…t in the alignment case is higher than the optimal pro…t in the no-alignment case.
Example 1 Let n = 2; and let
and h i is one of the solutions of the following equation in h
The relevant solution to this quadratic equation is
be selected, that is m = 1:
For each project i; let G i (q i ) be de…ned as in Section I, and let g i be de…ned
as in Section II. For simplicity, assume that G i (q i ) g i for all i: We will show that the optimal mechanism selects the project which has the highest value of some project-speci…c transformation K i (q i ) of its quality q i . Let K i (q i ) be the function such that
Also, for each i; we let K i (q i ) := max j6 =i fK j (q j ) ; 0g and we say that agent i is competing if the optimal allocation depends on his report, that is if
: For a competing agent, we let agent i's quality threshold be
This is the reported quality of agent i at which the allocation changes, holding the other agent's reports …xed. We show the following result.
Theorem D: Let m = 1: The mechanism that randomly selects with equal probabilities among the projects with the highest value K i (q i ) above 0 (the outside option), selects the outside option if none exceeds this level, and pays the following transfers, is optimal under IR, LL and IC constraints. For each q; and each i:
If agent i is competing and selected with positive probability (i.e. z i q i ) and
unwilling at his quality threshold (i.e. z i < q i ), he receives a transfer If agent i is competing, but he is either not selected or he is selected with probability less than one (i.e. q i z i ) and willing at his quality threshold (i.e. q i z i ), he receives a transfer
If agent i is not competing, but is selected (i.e. K i (q i ) < K i q i ), he receives a transfer
In all other cases, agent i receives no transfer.
Hence, if a competing agent is unwilling at his quality threshold, and regardless of whether he is willing or not at his true quality, he receives a positive transfer only if the mechanism allows him to decrease his probability to be selected by misreporting (a quality level lower than his true quality). In this case, if his true quality is slightly above the threshold (implying he is unwilling), the transfer keeps him from misreporting a lower quality level in order not to be selected. If his true quality is higher, the transfer keeps him from misreporting a quality level slightly above the threshold, in order to receive a positive transfer.
If a competing agent's is willing at his quality threshold, and regardless of whether he is willing or not at his true type, he receives a positive transfer only if the mechanism allows him to increase his probability of being selected by misreporting (a quality level higher than his true quality). In this case, if his type is slightly below his threshold type, the transfer keeps him from misreporting a high quality level in order to be selected. If his type is lower, the transfer keeps him from mimicking a type slightly below the threshold type, in order to receive a positive transfer.
It is helpful to understand the role of the constraints IC, IR and LL in determining the transfers, holding the allocation …xed at the optimum.
If only IC and LL are imposed, at the optimal transfer, four cases can occur.
In the …rst case, if agent i is competing and unwilling at his quality threshold, he receives a positive transfer if he is selected and no transfer if he is not selected. is not competing but is selected, his utility is below zero if his quality is near the lowest possible level: when the IR constraint is added, agent i is must now receive a positive transfer independent of his reported quality which must be large enough to maintain his utility at zero, when his quality is the lowest possible.
If only IC and IR are imposed, at the optimal transfer, three cases can occur.
In the …rst case, if agent i is competing and unwilling at his quality threshold, he receives a positive transfer if he is selected and no transfer if he is not selected. 5 The addition of the LL constraint makes no di¤erence in this case. In the second case, if agent i is competing and willing at his quality threshold, he receives no transfer if he is not selected and receives a negative transfer if he is selected: when the LL constraint is added, agent i must now receive a positive transfer when he is not selected and no transfer when he is selected, as in the optimal mechanism when only IC and LL are imposed. In the third and last case, if agent i is not competing, then 5 The transfers in this case are identical to those of the optimal mechanism when only IC and LL are imposed.
regardless of his reported quality, he either receives no transfer (if he is not selected), or he receives a positive transfer (if he is selected). Either way, the addition of the LL constraint makes no di¤erence in this case.
Proof of Theorem D. For all q i ; let M i (q i ) = p i (q i ; q i ) b i (q i ) + t i (q i ; q i ) be de…ned as the utility of the highest quality agent i; when he truthfully reports his quality q i and other agents report qualities q i . As in the main case considered in the paper, the agency's objective function equals
We maximize this value, over (p i (q)) i for all q, and (M i (q i )) i for all q i ; under feasibility, incentive-compatibility, limited liability and individual rationality. We only impose a subset of the constraints, the other constraints turn out not to be binding. Feasibility X i p i (q) 1 and p i (q) 0 for all q:
No incentive to misreport for the highest type level:
Limited liability: t i (q) 0 for all q:
The last two constraints imply
Individual rationality for the lowest quality level q i :
Step 2: For all q i ;
The inequality is obtained from IC for all q i ; and from IR for q i = q i :
Step 3: From steps 1 and 2, from the de…nition of v i and because i (q i ) 2 [0; 1] on its domain, it follows that for all q i ;
Step 4: We then obtain
i where the last inequality holds because of the feasibility constraints. Finally, the mechanism proposed in the Theorem satis…es all the constraints, and reaches the bound because when we substitute it in the above inequalities, they all hold as equalities. This is because the proposed mechanism has the following properties.
The IC constraints bind for all i and all q i .
For all i; and all q i with G i (q i ) b 0 (q i ) f i( q i ) K i (q i ) ; the LL constraint of agent i binds for all q i q i ; in particular for all q i such that G i (q i ) g i :
For all i; and all q i with K i (q i ) < G i (q i ) ; the IR constraint of agent i binds for q i = q i :
